Metadata in Context – An Ontological and Normative Analysis of the NSA’s Bulk Telephony Metadata Collection Program by Kift, Paula & Nissenbaum, Helen
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Metadata in Context –An Ontological and 
Normative Analysis of the NSA’s Bulk Telephony 
Metadata Collection Program 
PAULA KIFT & HELEN NISSENBAUM* 
CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 334 
II.  ONTOLOGICAL ANALYSIS ........................................................... 336 
 A.  Defining Metadata .............................................................. 336 
 B.  Classifying Metadata in the Law......................................... 339 
  1.  Content v. Non-content .................................................. 339 
  2.  Private records v. Business records held by third  
   parties ............................................................................. 342 
III.  NORMATIVE ANALYSIS ............................................................... 350 
 A.  Contextual Integrity ........................................................... 350 
  1.  Voluntariness .................................................................. 353 
  2.  Capabilities ..................................................................... 358 
  3.  Assumption of risk .......................................................... 363 
 B.  Evaluation ........................................................................... 367 
 C.  Outlook ............................................................................... 370 
IV.  CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 371 
 
 
 
 
* Paula Kift is a recent graduate of the master’s program in Media, Culture and 
Communication at NYU. Helen Nissenbaum is Director of the Information Law Institute 
and Professor in the Department of Media, Culture, and Communication at NYU. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY FOR THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 
334 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 13:2 
 
I. INTRODUCTION** 
A man writes a dozen letters to different people. No 
person would be permitted to publish a list of the 
letters written.  
—Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right 
to Privacy (1890). 
In the aftermath of the Snowden revelations, the National Security 
Agency (NSA) responded to fears about warrantless domestic 
surveillance programs by emphasizing that it was collecting only the 
metadata, and not the content, of communications. When justifying 
their activities, the NSA offered the following rationale: because data 
involves content and metadata does not, a reasonable expectation of 
privacy extends only to the former but not the latter. In other words, 
the NSA drew a normative conclusion about differential treatment of 
data and metadata based on an ontological distinction it claims exists 
between the two. Our paper challenges this argument. More 
specifically, we contend that privacy is defined not only by the types of 
information at hand, but also by the context in which information is 
collected. This context has changed dramatically. Defining privacy as 
contextual integrity we are able, in the first place, to explain why the 
bulk telephony metadata collection program violated expectations of 
privacy and, in the second, to evaluate whether the program’s 
purported benefits to national security can be justified – in light of its 
material costs, on one hand, and its infringements on civil liberties, on 
the other hand. 
The first part of our paper traces the roots of the data/metadata 
distinction to the library and computer sciences, where metadata is 
 
 
 
 
** We are grateful for opportunities to present this work at the Privacy Research Group 
(PRG) at NYU in April 2015, the European Privacy Law Scholars Conference (PLSC) in 
October 2015, and the Oxford Internet Institute (OII) in May 2016 where we received 
invaluable comments. We owe a debt of gratitude to Peter Shane and Dennis Hirsch for 
organizing the “NSA Bulk Metadata Collection: Evaluating Privacy through the Lens of 
Contextual Integrity” symposium at The Ohio State University (OSU) Moritz College of 
Law in November 2016 and to respondents Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Patrick Kelley, Gabe 
Maldoff, and Omer Tene, for enormously helpful remarks on our paper. Thanks go to 
Susan Landau for astute commentary. We owe a particular debt to Katherine J. Strandburg 
and Kiel Brennan-Marquez for generous intellectual guidance throughout the writing 
process. We acknowledge support from the Digital Trust Foundation (DTF), the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Hewlett Foundation Cyber Scholars 
Program. 
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characterized as data used to describe other data. In the aftermath of 
the Snowden revelations, however, the courts struggled to 
characterize metadata in light of precedent. As a result, an assessment 
of whether the bulk collection of telephony metadata violates a 
reasonable expectation of privacy seems to have been rooted in three 
constitutionally relevant dichotomies, namely content vs. non-content 
data, private records vs. business records held by third parties, and 
hard-to-obtain information vs. information “in plain view.” Our paper 
traces the genealogy of cases that have influenced these distinctions in 
order to explain why the judges presiding over the two cases that have 
challenged the NSA’s program thus far – Judge Leon in Klayman v. 
Obama (2013) and Judge Pauley in ACLU v. Clapper (2013) – 
reached opposite conclusions as to whether the bulk telephony 
metadata collection program violates the Fourth Amendment. Our 
paper ultimately supports the argument of the Klayman court that 
even if the nature of metadata has not changed (and this is debatable), 
the circumstances in which it is collected have. Whether the bulk 
collection of telephony metadata violates a reasonable expectation of 
privacy thus requires not only an ontological analysis of what 
metadata “is” but also an assessment of its normative significance in 
light of an evolving social and technological environment. 
 The second part of the paper develops this normative analysis and 
demonstrates that the circumstances in which metadata is shared 
today – be it telephony, internet, location or even biometric 
“metadata” – are radically different from the circumstances of the 
cases upon which courts have relied to distinguish metadata from data 
in the past.1 These differences primarily manifest themselves in the 
ability of information subjects to share information voluntarily; the 
ability of the holders of our metadata to aggregate, store, combine 
and analyze that data; and the extent to which we, the data subjects, 
assume the risk of metadata being shared beyond the purpose for 
which it was originally provided. Significantly, we propose a three-
pronged test for evaluating the voluntariness of sharing information 
with third parties, namely, first, whether a person knowingly shares 
information with a third party, second, whether a person has an 
alternative not to do so, and third, whether that alternative is 
reasonable. Adopting the framework of contextual integrity, the paper 
then assesses the impact of social and technological changes in the 
information environment on the actors, attributes and transmission 
 
 
 
 
1 Most notably Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979); see infra Section II.B. 
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principles of relevant information flows to determine whether the 
NSA’s bulk telephony metadata collection program violates the 
principle of contextual integrity, and hence privacy expectations. In 
light of contextual values and ends, our evaluation of the program 
demonstrates that the benefits of the bulk collection of telephony 
metadata to national security are outweighed by the program’s costs, 
as we take account of both money and manpower, on one hand, and 
the program’s infringements on civil liberties, such as privacy, 
freedom of speech and association, transparency, due process and the 
balance of power between the government and its citizens, on the 
other. The paper concludes that the NSA’s justification for its bulk 
telephony metadata collection program – namely, that metadata is 
equivalent to non-sensitive data – no longer makes sense. In light of 
the theory of contextual integrity, it never made any sense to begin 
with. 
II. ONTOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
A. Defining Metadata  
Metadata is “data about data,” or information used to classify 
other information.2  Metadata has played an important role in library 
and computer sciences because it allows for knowledge management, 
for example, in the case of books, enabling a useful classification 
according to such metadata as author, title, date of a publication, as 
well as publisher, size, number of pages, and genre. In a library 
catalog, metadata allows patrons to locate books they were expressly 
seeking or to discover books of potential interest about which they 
may not have previously known. Beyond books, metadata also plays 
 
 
 
 
2 See Metadata, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/metadata 
[http://perma.cc/NJZ5-K25Q] (defining metadata as “information that is held as a 
description of stored data”); Metadata, OED.COM, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/117150?redirectedFrom=metadata [http://perma.cc/8HL5-
KRR3] (defining metadata as “data that describes and gives information about other data”). The 
OED also quotes Philip R. Bagley’s definition of metadata: “As important as being able to 
combine data elements to make composite data elements is the ability to associate explicitly 
with a data element a second data element which represents data ‘about’ the first data element. 
This second data element we might term a ‘metadata element.’ Examples of such metadata 
elements are: an identifier, a main ‘prescriptor’ which specifies from what domain the value of 
the first element must be taken, an access code which limits the conditions under which the first 
data element can be accessed.” PHILIP R. BAGLEY, EXTENSION OF PROGRAMMING LANGUAGE 
CONCEPTS 26 (1968). 
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an important role in a myriad of different information searches 
serving critical organizational functions that we may not typically 
associate with the term. A Word document, for example, includes 
metadata such as the file name and author, the time and date of its 
creation, and the file format and size. Tweets not only consist of 140 
signs but also of a host of metadata, including the author’s name and 
biography, the date his account was created, the number of users he is 
following, and the location and time zone from which his Tweet is 
sent.3 What makes metadata so useful is the fact that, generally unlike 
the contents of a communication, it can be easily read and processed 
by machines.4 Indeed, as Cory Doctorow noted in 2001, if everyone 
were to “create good metadata for the purposes of describing their 
goods, services and information, it would be a trivial matter to search 
the Internet for highly qualified, context-sensitive results: a fan could 
find all the downloadable music in a given genre, a manufacturer 
could efficiently discover supplies, travelers could easily choose a 
hotel room for an upcoming trip.”5  
However, the term metadata gained some notoriety in the 
aftermath of the Snowden revelations as the first set of documents 
released demonstrated that a classified Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (FISC) order had compelled the American 
telecommunications company Verizon to hand over the telephony 
metadata of virtually all American subscribers on an ongoing 
permanent basis.6 Telephony metadata in this case included 
“communications routing information, including but not limited to 
 
 
 
 
3 Sarah Perez, This is What a Tweet Looks Like, READWRITE (Apr. 19, 2010), 
http://readwrite.com/2010/04/19/this_is_what_a_tweet_looks_like#awesm=~obCj5KB
BrmSTfj [http://perma.cc/69U5-7LA9]. For further examples, see Steven J. Vaughan-
Nichols, Big Data, Metadata, and Traffic Analysis: What the NSA is Really Doing, IT 
WORLD (July 26, 2013), http://www.itworld.com/article/2829511/big-data/big-data--
metadata--and-traffic-analysis--what-the-nsa-is-really-doing.html 
[http://perma.cc/C32G-56TU]. 
4 Jaron Lanier, The Meta Question, THE NATION (July 8, 2015), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/174776/meta-question [http://perma.cc/RK7R-S8FH].  
5 Cory Doctorow, Metacrap, THE WELL (Aug. 26, 2001), 
http://www.well.com/~doctorow/metacrap.htm [http://perma.cc/PFM6-N2G9]. 
Doctorow also points to significant limitations to the utility of metadata. 
6 Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers 
Daily, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order 
[http://perma.cc/97GV-7HQP].  
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session identifying information (e.g., originating and terminating 
phone number, International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) 
number, International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI) 
number, etc.), trunk identifier, telephone calling card numbers, and 
time and duration of call” but not “the substantive content of any 
communication.”7 In defending these practices, the NSA asserted that, 
because it was collecting only the metadata and not the content of 
communications, its bulk telephony metadata collection program did 
not raise any privacy concerns. 
This argument has now been scrutinized in court: Judge Leon in 
Klayman v. Obama (2013)8 reached the conclusion that the program 
violated a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment, while Judge Pauley in ACLU v. Clapper (2013)9 ruled 
that it did not. After tracing the genealogy of cases upon which these 
respective decisions were based, we discovered that in attempting to 
classify the term metadata in light of precedent, the courts relied on 
three constitutionally relevant distinctions, namely non-content v. 
content data; business records held by third parties v. private 
records; and information “in plain view” v. hard-to-obtain 
information.10 Although neither judge argued that the conception of 
metadata – its ontological status – had changed over time, Judge 
Pauley maintained that an ontological analysis of metadata was 
sufficient for resolving the case, whereas Judge Leon engaged in a 
further normative analysis of the evolving social and technological 
environment – an analysis which was ultimately critical to his 
decision. 
 
 
 
 
7 In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the 
Production of Tangible Things from Verizon Business Network Services, Inc. on behalf of 
MCI Communication Services, Inc. D/B/A Verizon Business Services, No. BR 13-80, at 2-3 
(FISA Ct. 2013). 
8 Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 39 (D.D.C. 2013). 
9 ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
10 For an excellent technical discussion of the term metadata, see Stephen M. Bellovin, 
Matt Blaze, Susan Landau & Stephanie K. Pell, It’s Too Complicated: How the Internet 
Upends Katz, Smith, and Electronic Surveillance Law, HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2016). For a 
similar discussion in the UK context, see SOPHIE STALLA-BOURDILLON, EVANGELIA 
PAPADAKI & TIM CHOWN, METADATA, TRAFFIC DATA, SERVICE USE INFORMATION . . . WHAT IS 
THE DIFFERENCE? DOES THE DIFFERENCE MATTER? AN INTERDISCIPLINARY VIEW FROM THE 
UK, DATA PROTECTION ON THE MOVE (2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2625181 [http://perma.cc/8KPP-
7FU3].  
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B. Classifying Metadata in the Law 
1. Content v. Non-content 
The first time the U.S. Supreme Court distinguished between 
content and non-content was in the context of Ex parte Jackson 
(1878), which questioned whether and the extent to which U.S. 
authorities could interfere with the mail in order to prevent the 
circulation of “obscene” materials. The Court concluded that “a 
distinction is to be made between different kinds of mail matter, – 
between what is intended to be kept free from inspection, such as 
letters, and sealed packages subject to letter postage; and what is open 
to inspection, such as newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, and other 
printed matter, purposely left in a condition to be examined. Letters 
and sealed packages of this kind in the mail are as fully guarded from 
examination and inspection, except as to their outward form and 
weight, as if they were retained by the parties forwarding them in 
their own domiciles.”11 The Court thus argued that, while police 
officers should not be able to tear open sealed letters and packages, 
they should be free to look at the outside appearance and labeling 
thereof since that information necessarily had to be visible in order to 
enable them to deliver mail from origin to destination.12 
In 1928, by contrast, the Court ruled in Olmstead that the content 
of telephone conversations was not analogous to the content of sealed 
letters. It argued that 
It is plainly within the words of the Amendment to say 
that the unlawful rifling by a government agent of a 
sealed letter is a search and seizure of the sender's 
papers or effects. The letter is a paper, an effect, and in 
the custody of a Government that forbids carriage 
except under its protection. The United States takes no 
such care of telegraph or telephone messages as of 
mailed sealed letters. The Amendment does not forbid 
 
 
 
 
11 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878) (emphasis added). 
12 The protection of the content of sealed letters and packages does not extend to fourth 
class mail, however. See United States v. Riley, 554 F.2d 1282, 1283 (4th Cir. 1977) 
(arguing that “unlike first class mail, there is no expectation of privacy in the forwarding of 
fourth class mail . . .” since the petitioner “could have availed himself of the protection 
afforded by first class postage.”).  
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what was done here. There was no searching. There 
was no seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of 
the sense of hearing and that only. There was no entry 
of the houses or offices of the defendants.13 
Justice Brandeis, however, disagreed: “the mail is a public service 
furnished by the Government. The telephone is a public service 
furnished by its authority. There is, in essence, no difference between 
the sealed letter and the private telephone message.”14 The content of 
telephone conversations should consequently enjoy the same legal 
protection as the content of letters. 
The Court revisited this question four decades later in Katz v. 
United States (1967). In Katz, the police had attached an electronic 
listening and recording device to the outside of a telephone booth 
from which the petitioner was conducting illegal gambling activities. 
The Court ruled that, although it had “supposed in Olmstead that 
surveillance without any trespass and without the seizure of any 
material object fell outside the ambit of the Constitution, we have 
since departed from the narrow view on which that decision rested. 
Indeed, we have expressly held that the Fourth Amendment governs 
not only the seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the 
recording of oral statements . . . .”15 According to the Katz Court, “no 
less than an individual in a business office, in a friend’s apartment, or 
in a taxicab, a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the 
door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is 
surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece 
will not be broadcast to the world. To read the Constitution more 
narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come 
to play in private communication.”16 But the Katz decision was 
exclusively about the protection of the contents of telephone 
conversations; the Katz Court was not in a position to comment on 
what protections extended to information that was solely about the 
call. Rather, the extent to which the Fourth Amendment protects non-
content, as opposed to the content of telephone conversations, was 
 
 
 
 
13 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928). 
14 Id. at 475. 
15 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
16 Id. at 352. 
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decided in the context of United States v. New York Telephone 
Company (1977) and Smith v. Maryland (1979). 
In New York Telephone Company, the Court addressed the 
question of whether installing and using a pen register device to 
record the numbers dialed from a phone, falls under the definition of 
an “intercept” according to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (the Wiretap Statute). The Act defined an 
“intercept” as “aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, 
electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, 
mechanical, or other device.”17 The Court denied that pen registers 
fall under the definition of the Act “because they do not acquire the 
‘contents’ of communications, as the term is defined by 18 U.S.C. 
2510(8).”18 As the Court explained, “these devices do not hear sound. 
They disclose only the telephone numbers that have been dialed – a 
means of establishing communication. Neither the purport of any 
communication between the caller and the recipient of the call, their 
identities, nor whether the call was even completed is disclosed by 
pen registers.”19 In distinguishing the register of numbers dialed from 
the aural, substantive content of the call, the Court thus made an 
ontological distinction between data and metadata on which it 
furthermore based the normative conclusion that “Congress did not 
view pen registers as posing a threat to privacy of the same dimension 
as the interception of oral communications . . . .”20 
The distinction between content and non-content information of 
telephone conversations was further solidified in Smith v. Maryland, 
a landmark case in Fourth Amendment doctrine. The Smith Court 
addressed the question of whether the warrantless installation and 
use of a pen register violated a reasonable expectation of privacy 
under the Fourth Amendment. The petitioner claimed that it did, 
drawing an analogy to the intercept at issue in Katz. However, the 
Smith Court distinguished pen registers “from the listening device 
employed in Katz, for pen registers do not acquire the contents of 
communications”21 and consequently ruled that pen register 
 
 
 
 
17 See 18 U.S.C. 2510(4) (2016). 
18 United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167 (1977). 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 168. 
21 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) (emphasis added). 
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information fell outside the ambit of the Fourth Amendment. In 
response to Smith v. Maryland, Congress passed the Pen Register 
Act, which ensured that pen register information would be granted at 
least some form of protection under the law, albeit substantially 
weaker than that granted to the content of communications.22 
Because the distinction between content and non-content 
information is primarily drawn in the statutory, not the constitutional 
context, neither Judge Leon nor Judge Pauley explicitly discusses it in 
the context of Fourth Amendment law. Both judges do accept, 
however, that the metadata at issue in the NSA’s program is 
essentially equivalent to the pen register data at issue in Smith. As 
Judge Leon points out, “what metadata is has not changed over time. 
As in Smith, the types of information at issue in this case are 
relatively limited: phone numbers dialed, date, time, and the like.”23 
Since the case law suggests that pen register data is non-content 
information, and non-content information is equivalent to non-
sensitive information, the telephony metadata collected by the NSA 
was thus deemed, prima facie, to be non-sensitive information as 
well. 
2. Private records v. Business records held by third parties 
Another distinction that significantly influenced the decisions in 
ACLU v. Clapper and Klayman v. Obama is that between private 
records held by individuals and business records held by third 
parties. This distinction goes back to a series of cases in the 1950s and 
 
 
 
 
22 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 295 (5th ed. 
2015). The Pen Register Act does not, however, apply to the NSA’s bulk telephony 
metadata collection program because the latter is considered foreign intelligence collection 
and thus governed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), as amended by 
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. See infra Section III.B. For a detailed statutory and 
constitutional analysis of the NSA’s bulk telephony metadata collection program, see Laura 
K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 37 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757 (2014). 
23 Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 39 (D.D.C. 2013). Quoted in ACLU v. Clapper, 959 
F. Supp. 2d 724, 752 (S.D.N.Y.). At the same time, Judge Leon acknowledges that his 
statement is not entirely accurate since “the pen register in Smith did not tell the 
government whether calls were completed or the duration of any calls, . . . whereas that 
information is captured in the NSA’s metadata collection.” Furthermore, “telephony 
metadata can reveal the user’s location, . . . which in 1979 would have been entirely 
unnecessary given that landline phones are tethered to buildings.” Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 
2d at 35 (internal citations omitted). 
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60s in which the Supreme Court decided that the protection of the 
Fourth Amendment did not extend to incriminating statements made 
in the presence of undercover police agents.24 According to the Court, 
a defendant does not have “a justifiable and constitutionally protected 
expectation that a person with whom he is conversing will not then or 
later reveal the conversation to the police.”25 Significantly, the scope of 
the doctrine of misplaced trust, initially limited to people, was 
eventually extended to businesses, too. In United States v. Miller 
(1976), the Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his bank records because they 
only contained “information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and 
exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.”26 
Referencing White, the Court specified that “the Fourth Amendment 
does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third 
party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the 
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for 
a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not 
be betrayed.”27 The majority in Miller thus established the 
consequential third-party doctrine. In Smith, too, the Court accepted 
this reasoning and argued that “a person has no legitimate expectation 
of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”28 
The third-party doctrine significantly influenced Judge Pauley’s 
decision in ACLU v. Clapper: “Clear precedent applies because Smith 
held that a subscriber has no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
telephony metadata created by third parties.”29 Although Judge Leon 
also acknowledged that the type of data collected by the government 
in its bulk telephony metadata program was essentially equivalent to 
 
 
 
 
24 See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752-53 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 
U.S. 293, 311 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 212 (1966); Lopez v. United 
States, 373 U.S. 427, 440 (1963); Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 757-58 (1952). For a 
detailed discussion of these cases, see Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 
107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 567-569.  
25 White, 401 U.S. at 749. 
26 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976). 
27 Id. at 443. 
28 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979).  
29 ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (internal citations omitted). 
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the pen register data at issue in Smith,30 for him this fact was not 
dispositive. Rather, as we demonstrate in the following section, Judge 
Leon’s decision was influenced by a series of cases that were far more 
concerned with the changing nature and circumstances of 
government information collection than with the type of information 
collected. 
3. Hard-to-obtain information v. Information in plain view  
The distinction between hard-to-obtain information and 
information “in plain view” differs from the previous two in that it 
does not depend on the type of information at hand, but rather on 
how easily available it is. Generally, the courts have decided that 
petitioners have no reasonable expectation of privacy in information 
“in plain view” because they assumed the risk that the police would 
have access to that information.31 The “plain view doctrine” is based 
on the idea that officers should not have to turn away from evidence 
that is right in front of their eyes. However, whether something is “in 
 
 
 
 
30 See Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 30 (“The Supreme Court held that Smith had 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed from his phone because he 
voluntarily transmitted them to his phone company . . .”).  
31 See United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927) (arguing that the use of search lights to 
examine objects in plain view is permissible under the Fourth Amendment); Ker v. California, 
374 U.S. 23, 43 (1963) (arguing that the seizure of a brick of marijuana “did not constitute a 
search, since the officer merely saw what was placed before him in full view”); Lewis v. United 
States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966) (arguing that “when, as here, the home is converted into a 
commercial center to which outsiders are invited for purposes of transacting unlawful business, 
that business is entitled to no greater sanctity than if it were carried on in a store, a garage, a car, 
or on the street”); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (arguing that “[w]hat a person 
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection”); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (arguing that “it has 
long been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the 
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence”). The “plain 
view doctrine” was extended by the “open fields doctrine” in that individuals have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the fields that they own. See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58-59 
(1924) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to objects discarded in the open 
fields even if the land belongs to the petitioner); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 171 (1984) 
(arguing that “[b]ecause open fields are accessible to the public and the police in ways that a 
home, office, or commercial structure would not be, and because fences or ‘No Trespassing’ 
signs do not effectively bar the public from viewing open fields, the asserted expectation of 
privacy in open fields is not one that society recognizes as reasonable”). The courts did, however, 
carve out an exception for a home’s so-called curtilage because “the area in question is so 
intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed within the home’s ‘umbrella’ of Fourth 
Amendment protection.” United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987), quoted in SOLOVE & 
SCHWARTZ, supra note 22, at 307. 
2017] KIFT & NISSENBAUM 345 
 
plain view” has become more complicated over time given that police 
officers increasingly resort to advanced, technologically-enabled 
surveillance techniques. For instance, in Florida v. Riley (1989) the 
police circled the respondent’s property with a helicopter in order to 
determine, by virtue of two missing roof panels, that the respondent 
was growing marijuana in a greenhouse adjacent to his home. The 
majority argued that, “the police, like the public, would have been free 
to inspect the backyard garden from the street if their view had been 
unobstructed. They were likewise free to inspect the yard from the 
vantage point of an aircraft flying in the navigable airspace as this 
plane was.”32 However, the dissent objected, saying that the question 
“must be not whether the police were where they had a right to be, but 
whether public observation of Riley’s curtilage was so commonplace 
that Riley’s expectation of privacy in his backyard could not be 
considered reasonable.”33 A similar question was raised in Dow 
Chemical Co. v. United States (1986) where the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) used a precision aerial mapping camera to 
take photographs of a chemical plant. The majority argued that “[t]he 
mere fact that human vision is enhanced somewhat, at least to the 
degree here, does not give rise to constitutional problems.”34 The 
dissent, on the other hand, objected that this would undermine the 
court’s longstanding “standard that ensured that Fourth Amendment 
rights would retain their vitality as technology expanded the 
Government’s capacity to commit unsuspected intrusions into private 
areas and activities.”35 The point at which advanced surveillance 
techniques become so intrusive that one can no longer speak of 
information “in plain view” can be determined somewhat more easily 
when the technologies in question capture information emanating 
from within the home. For instance, when in Kyllo v. United States 
(2001) the police used a thermal imager to determine whether the 
suspect was growing marijuana in his home the court argued that the 
officers obtained information that is “not visible to the naked eye”36 
and thus intruded upon the constitutionally protected space of the 
 
 
 
 
32 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449-50 (1989). 
33 Id. at 460 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J. and Stevens, J., dissenting).  
34 Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986). 
35 Id. at 240. 
36 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001). 
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home. In sum, for the above cases, ascertaining whether police officers 
were collecting information “in plain view” is pertinent to the question 
whether such collection is subject to Fourth Amendment protection. 
What constitutes information in “plain view,” however, has been 
complicated by the introduction of new technologies. When, as in 
Kyllo, new technologies are used to capture information emanating 
from within the home, the Court has generally inclined toward seeing 
it covered by Fourth Amendment protection.  
The Court was confronted with a similar set of questions in cases 
involving information gathered in public spaces. In United States v. 
Knotts (1983), for example, when the police followed the movements 
of the defendant by attaching a beeper to a chloroform container he 
had purchased and placed in his car, the defendant challenged the 
monitoring on Fourth Amendment grounds.  The Supreme Court, 
however, ruled that “[t]he beeper surveillance amounted principally to 
following an automobile on public streets and highways. A person 
traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements.”37 A beeper, the Court 
reasoned, did not raise Fourth Amendment concerns in this case 
because it did not reveal any information “that would not have been 
visible to the naked eye.”38 The respondent objected that the result of 
the ruling would be that “twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen 
of this country will be possible, without judicial knowledge or 
supervision.”39 But the Court suggested that these were mere 
speculations and “if such dragnet-type law enforcement practices as 
respondent envisions would eventually occur, there will be time 
enough then to determine whether different constitutional principles 
may be applicable.”40 By contrast, in United States v. Karo, the Court 
specified that, while attaching a beeper itself does not raise any Fourth 
Amendment concerns, it does when the beeper allows the police to 
track movements within a house.41 Karo was further distinguished 
 
 
 
 
37 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 276 (1983). 
38 Id. at 285. 
39 Id. at 283 (internal citations omitted). 
40 Id. at 284. 
41 “There is no reason in this case to deviate from the general rule that a search of a house 
should be conducted pursuant to a warrant.” United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 706 
(1983). 
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from Knotts on the grounds that, in Knotts, the beeper was used to 
monitor movements in public, while in Karo it was used to monitor 
movements in a private space.42 In other words, the defendant in 
Knotts assumed the risk of surveillance when travelling on public 
thoroughfares, whereas in Karo the defendant invoked his right 
against government surveillance within the constitutionally protected 
space of the home. 
At the same time, the court did not categorically rule out that a 
person could not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information that is theoretically public. Indeed, in U.S. Department of 
Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press, the Supreme 
Court recognized the defendant’s right to privacy in information 
contained in public rap sheets because “the compilation of otherwise 
hard-to-obtain information alters the privacy interest implicated by 
the disclosure of that information.”43 The Court effectively created a 
right to practical obscurity in information contained in public rap 
sheets.44 Although the Court has generally been reluctant to extend 
this right to other contexts,45 the concept of practical obscurity has 
resurfaced in other cases, at least implicitly. For example, in United 
States v. Jones, the police engaged in the warrantless GPS monitoring 
of a suspect’s car for a period of 28 days. The majority resolved the 
case on the basis of the trespass doctrine, arguing that it was the 
 
 
 
 
42 For an early defense of the right to privacy in public, see Helen Nissenbaum, Toward an 
Approach to Privacy in Public: Challenges of Information Technology, 7 ETHICS & 
BEHAVIOR 207 (1997).  
43 U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 764 
(1989) (emphasis added). For a contextual analysis of the impact the digitalization of court 
records has on privacy concerns, see Amanda Conley, Anupam Datta, Helen Nissenbaum & 
Divya Sharma, Sustaining Privacy and Open Justice in the Transition to Online Court 
Records: A Multidisciplinary Inquiry, 71 MD. L. REV. 772 (2012). 
44 “Where, as here, the subject of a rap sheet is a private citizen and the information is in 
the Government's control as a compilation, rather than as a record of what the Government 
is up to, the privacy interest in maintaining the rap-sheet's ‘practical obscurity’ is always at 
its apex while the FOIA-based public interest in disclosure is at its nadir.” U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, 489 U.S. at 750 (emphasis added). See also Danny Weitzner, Privacy, Practical 
Obscurity and the Power of the Semantic Web, MIT DECENTRALIZED INFO. GRP., 
http://dig.csail.mit.edu/breadcrumbs/node/125 [https://perma.cc/J9EB-7REN] (defining 
practical obscurity as “legal doctrine that one may have a privacy interest in the 
compilation of information (aka a dossier) even though each piece of information 
composing the dossier is itself publicly available”). 
45 See Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CAL. L. 
REV. 1, 21-22 (2013). 
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attachment of the GPS device to the car that violated the defendant’s 
Fourth Amendment rights. In separate concurrences, Justices 
Sotomayor and Alito questioned whether the aggregation of 
otherwise public information over time would not raise separate 
constitutional concerns. Particularly relevant to this article is the 
connection drawn by Justice Sotomayor between information in plain 
view (such as a car on public thoroughfares) and information 
“voluntarily” provided to third parties (referring extensively to 
information generally classified as metadata): “People disclose the 
phone numbers they dial or text to their cellular providers; the URLs 
that they visit and the e-mail addresses with which they correspond to 
their Internet service providers; and the books, groceries, and 
medications they purchase to online retailers.”46 Justice Sotomayor 
ultimately questioned the viability of the third-party doctrine 
established under Miller and Smith given the ease with which both 
metadata and information in plain view, respectively, may be 
aggregated today.47  
Judge Pauley, however, refused to attach too much importance to 
the concurring opinions in Jones; after all, the “Supreme Court did 
not overrule Smith.”48 For Judge Leon, on the other hand, the fact that 
the NSA was collecting telephony metadata in bulk and on an 
“ongoing daily basis”49 was dispositive to distinguishing Klayman v. 
Obama from Smith v. Maryland.50 For Judge Leon, the essential 
question was normative, not ontological. He decided, despite the 
similarity of the data at hand in Klayman and Smith, that: 
The question before me is not the same question that 
the Supreme Court confronted in Smith. To say the 
least, ‘whether the installation and use of a pen register 
 
 
 
 
46 United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
47 Id. (“I would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some member of 
the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment 
protection.”). 
48 ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). In support of this argument, 
see Orin Kerr, Debate: Metadata and the Fourth Amendment – A Reply to Jennifer 
Granick, JUST SEC. (Sept. 23, 2013), https://www.justsecurity.org/1009/debate-metadata-
fourth-amendment-reply-jennifer-granick/ [https://perma.cc/32HJ-ZY74].  
49 Greenwald, supra note 6. 
50 Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 18 (D.D.C. 2013). 
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constitutes a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment’ – under the circumstances addressed and 
contemplated in that case – is a far cry from the issue 
in this case. Indeed, the question in this case can more 
properly be styled as follows: When do present-day 
circumstances – the evolutions in the Government’s 
surveillance capabilities, citizens’ phone habits, and 
the relationship between the NSA and telecom 
companies – become so thoroughly unlike those 
considered by the Supreme Court thirty-four years ago 
that a precedent like Smith simply does not apply? The 
answer, unfortunately for the Government, is now.51 
Figure 1: Genealogy of case law and relevant technologies 
 
 
 
 
 
51 See id. Laura K. Donohue advances a similar argument in comparing bulk telephony 
metadata and the pen register data at issue in Smith. See Donohue, supra note 22, at 870-
71 (“The extent to which we rely on electronic communications to conduct our daily lives is 
of a fundamentally different scale and complexity than the situation that existed at the time 
the Court heard arguments in Smith. Resultantly, the extent of information that can be 
learned about not just individuals, but about neighborhoods, school boards, political 
parties, Girl Scout troops – indeed, about any social, political, or economic network – 
simply by placement of a pen register or trap and trace, is far beyond what the Court 
contemplated in 1979.”). See also Jennifer Granick, Debate: Metadata and the Fourth 
Amendment, JUST SEC. (Sept. 23, 2013), https://www.justsecurity.org/927/metadata-
fourth-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/G2M7-DVG3]. For a general overview of how the 
evolving social and technological environment affects, or should affect, Fourth Amendment 
law, see Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth Amendment 
Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614 (2011). 
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In sum, Judge Pauley emphasizes that the nature of telephony 
metadata has not changed (telephony metadata are business records, 
following Smith). Judge Leon, by contrast, argues that even if the 
nature of telephony metadata has not changed (and this is debatable), 
what has changed is the social and technological environment in 
which metadata is collected. The aggregation of bulk telephony 
metadata is not comparable to the limited collection of pen register 
information at issue in Smith, echoing Jones. In the normative 
analysis of our paper, we support and further expand on this claim. 
Based on the theory of contextual integrity, we provide a rigorous 
account why, even if one accepts that a reasonable line can be drawn 
between data and metadata, the prima facie assumption that data 
deserves greater privacy protections than metadata is fundamentally 
flawed. 
III. NORMATIVE ANALYSIS 
A. Contextual Integrity  
According to the theory of contextual integrity, the 
appropriateness of a particular information flow depends not only on 
the type of information in question (the attribute) but also on the 
actors involved (senders, subjects and recipients of an information 
type) and the transmission principles (constraints on flow). If a 
practice generates changes in any of these three parameters, a prima 
facie case exists for claiming that contextual integrity, and hence 
privacy, has been violated.52 This prima facie assessment does not 
necessarily mean, however, that the new practice needs to be 
abandoned. Indeed, if the new practice better promotes the values, 
goals and ends of a given context, then contextual integrity allows for 
and even encourages alterations in information flows.53 
Material advances in the science and technology of data along with 
institutional practices have dramatically altered the social and 
technological environment in which metadata is generated and 
 
 
 
 
52 HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF 
SOCIAL LIFE 150 (2010). 
53 Id. at 182. For a more detailed summary of the theory of contextual integrity, see Helen 
Nissenbaum, Respect for Context as a Benchmark for Privacy Online: What it is and isn’t, 
in SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY 286-88 (Beate Roessler & Dorota Mokrosinska eds., 
2015). 
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collected today. The framework of contextual integrity allows us to 
assess the impact that these changes have had on information flows. 
Accordingly, when information subjects no longer share their 
metadata voluntarily, this affects the transmission principle. When 
the recipients of metadata have vastly increased capabilities of 
aggregating, storing, combining and analyzing metadata, this changes 
the attribute. And when we assume the risk of surveillance whenever 
we impart with information, this introduces a wider range of actors 
into the information flow. A careful analysis of these 
interdependencies also challenges the dichotomies courts have used to 
distinguish metadata from data, namely: content vs. non-content data, 
private records vs. business records held by third parties, and hard-to-
obtain information vs. information “in plain view.”54 As we argue 
below, the fact that we no longer share information voluntarily 
undermines the notion that business records held by third parties 
deserve fewer privacy protections than private information held by the 
data subjects themselves. The fact that metadata is now aggregated, 
stored, combined and analyzed to enable a host of inferences to be 
drawn undermines the notion that metadata is non-content and 
therefore non-sensitive data. The fact that most of our metadata is no 
longer hard to obtain undermines the notion that we should assume 
the risk of surveillance whenever we impart with it.55 We elaborate on 
these claims below and explain their significance for our overarching 
thesis. 
  
 
 
 
 
54 See infra Section II.B. 
55 The last point, in particular, may seem counterintuitive at first, but makes sense when 
placed in the larger context of a free and open society, in which we should not be forced to 
assume the risk of surveillance whenever we impart with information; especially when we 
do not have a reasonable choice to withhold it. 
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Table 1: Impacts of changes in the social and technical environment 
on information flows and respective normative implications 
 
Changes in the 
social and 
technical 
environment 
Impact on 
information 
flow 
Normative 
implications 
Voluntariness 
Voluntarily 
sharing 
information 
means knowingly 
sharing 
information and 
having a 
reasonable 
alternative not to 
do so. Even if 
telephone 
subscribers 
knowingly share 
their metadata 
with phone 
companies, they 
do not have a 
reasonable 
alternative not to 
do so. Telephone 
subscribers 
therefore do not 
share their 
metadata 
voluntarily. 
This changes 
the 
transmission 
principle of 
the 
information 
flow 
This undermines the 
notion that business 
records should 
deserve fewer 
protections than 
private records. 
Capabilities 
The recipients of 
our metadata have 
vastly increased 
capabilities of 
aggregating, 
storing, combining 
and analyzing that 
data.  
This changes 
the attribute 
of the 
information 
flow 
 
Metadata can no 
longer be described 
as non-content and 
therefore non-
sensitive data 
because it can be as 
revealing, if not 
more revealing, of 
sensitive 
information as the 
content of 
communications. 
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Changes in the 
social and 
technical 
environment 
Impact on 
information 
flow 
Normative 
implications 
Assumption of 
risk 
Previously hard to 
obtain metadata 
has become easily 
accessible so that 
we effectively 
assume the risk of 
surveillance 
whenever we 
impart with the 
information. 
This 
introduces a 
vastly 
increased 
range of 
actors into 
previously 
limited 
information 
flows 
In a free and open 
society, 
communications 
metadata should 
deserve stronger 
legal protections as 
to not be as readily 
available to the 
police as it currently 
is. 
1. Voluntariness 
The question of voluntariness emerged in the early days of the 
third-party doctrine. We recall that, in United States v. Miller, the 
Court rejected the idea that the respondent enjoyed Fourth 
Amendment protection in his bank records because “all of the 
documents obtained, including financial statements and deposit slips, 
contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and 
exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.”56 
Along the same lines, in Smith v. Maryland, the majority suggested 
that “[w]hen he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed 
numerical information to the telephone company and ‘exposed’ that 
information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business. In so 
doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company would reveal to 
police the numbers he dialed.”57 However, the notion that the 
petitioners “voluntarily” handed over their data to the phone company 
and bank, respectively, was already contested at the time the cases 
were argued.58 In Miller, for example, Justice Brennan noted that “the 
disclosure by individuals or business firms of their financial affairs to 
 
 
 
 
56 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (emphasis added). 
57 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (emphasis added). 
58 For an early criticism in the academic literature, see John S. Applegate & Amy Applegate, 
Pen Registers after Smith v. Maryland, 15 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS - CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 753, 
765 (1980) (“The argument advanced by the Court that telephone users know that records 
will be made of toll calls and thus have no expectation of privacy is unconvincing.”). 
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a bank is not entirely volitional, since it is impossible to participate in 
the economic life of contemporary society without maintaining a bank 
account.”59  
Compare these two with cases involving cell-site location 
information (CSLI): Theoretically, CSLI is non-content information 
“in plain view” voluntarily conveyed to third parties, and some courts 
have indeed supported that claim. For instance, according to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, “[b]ecause a cell 
phone user makes a choice to get a phone, to select a particular service 
provider, and to make a call, and because he knows that the call 
conveys cell site information, the provider retains this information, 
and the provider will turn it over to the police if they have a court 
order, he voluntarily conveys his cell site data each time he makes a 
call.”60 But this distorts the original information flow. A cell phone 
user (the sender and information subject) conveys his cell site data 
(the attribute) “voluntarily” (the transmission principle) only to the 
service provider (the intended recipient). Once the information is 
passed to the police, the cell phone user has not “voluntarily” provided 
anything at all. Neither the recipient nor the transmission principle of 
the information flow are the same anymore. 
A further complication in the CSLI cases arises from the fact that 
most cell phone users do not even provide CSLI knowingly: “When a 
cell phone user makes a call, the only information that is voluntarily 
and knowingly conveyed to the phone company is the number that is 
dialed and there is no indication to the user that making that call will 
also locate the caller; when a cell phone user receives a call, he hasn’t 
voluntarily exposed anything at all. And a caller most certainly does 
not voluntarily provide the registration information that the phone 
automatically sends to the phone company every seven seconds 
whenever the phone is on, without notice to or control by the user.”61 
This sentiment was later echoed by the Eleventh Circuit and most 
 
 
 
 
59 Miller, 425 U.S. at 451 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 
Cal. 3d 238, 247 (1974)). 
60 In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 614 
(5th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added).  
61 Brief for Elec. Frontier Found. et al. at 21, as Amici Curiae Supporting Affirmance, In re 
Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Electronic 
Communication Service to Disclose Records to the Government, 620 F.3d 304 (3rd Cir. 
2010), https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/celltracking/filed_cell_tracking_brief.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z2G7-4UYX]; see also Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and 
the Fourth Amendment: A Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 684 (2011). 
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recently by the Fourth Circuit.62 The U.S. District Court, Southern 
District of Texas, further explains: 
Unlike the bank records in Miller or the phone 
numbers dialed in Smith, cell site data is neither 
tangible nor visible to a cell phone user. When a user 
turns on the phone and makes a call, she is not 
required to enter her own zip code, area code, or other 
location identifier. None of the digits pressed reveal her 
own location. Cell site data is generated automatically 
by the network, conveyed to the provider not by human 
hands, but by invisible radio signal. Thus, unlike in 
Miller or Smith, where the information at issue was 
unquestionably conveyed by the defendant to a third 
party, a cell phone user may well have no reason to 
suspect that her location was exposed to anyone. The 
assumption of risk theory espoused by Miller and 
Smith necessarily entails a knowing or voluntary act of 
disclosure; the Government has cited no case (and the 
court has found none) where unknowing, inadvertent 
disclosure of information by a defendant thereby 
precluded Fourth Amendment protection of that 
information.63 
It is worth noting the connection between these insights and 
traditional philosophical positions on (moral) responsibility, which 
require at the very minimum that actors are morally responsible for 
their actions insofar as they have been performed freely and 
knowingly.64 This account forms the basis of informed consent and the 
foundation for legal concepts surrounding liability. In our view, the 
limited understanding most of us have of digitally intermediated 
communication calls into question whether individuals using mobile 
phones, for the most part, are disclosing CSLI (and other metadata) 
voluntarily, let alone knowingly.  
 
 
 
 
62 United States v. Davis, No. 12-12928, at 22 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Graham, 
796 F.3d 332, 353 (4th Cir. 2015). 
63 In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 
844 (2010), vacated, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013).  
64 See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, Sua Culpa, in DEBORAH G. JOHNSON & JOHN W. SNAPPER, 
ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE USE OF COMPUTERS (1985); JOHN MARTIN FISCHER & MARK RAVIZZA, 
S.J., RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL: A THEORY OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (1st ed. 1998). 
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But even if the defendants in Miller and Smith voluntarily and 
knowingly conveyed information to a third party, they conveyed that 
information to a business for a particular purpose, and not to the 
police for the purpose of a criminal investigation. This is one of the 
reasons why transforming personal records into business records 
should not diminish but rather reinforce privacy expectations. When 
personal information is provided to create a business record, the 
reasonable expectation is precisely that that information will only be 
used for a business purpose. For this reason, we find the notion that 
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in information held in 
business records to be fundamentally flawed.65 
Several states have already rejected the third-party doctrine on 
this basis.66 For instance, in the context of a CSLI case in New Jersey, 
the state’s supreme court pointed out that “an individual’s privacy 
interests under New Jersey law does not turn on whether he or she is 
required to disclose information to third-party providers to obtain 
service. Just as customers must disclose details about their personal 
finances to the bank that manages their checking accounts, cell-phone 
users have no choice but to reveal certain information to their cellular 
provider. That is not a voluntary disclosure in a typical sense; it can 
only be avoided at the price of not using a cell phone.”67 
Similarly, the Supreme Court ruled in Ferguson v. City of 
Charleston that the police could not conduct warrantless and 
nonconsensual drug tests on urine samples provided by pregnant 
 
 
 
 
65 See also Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Fourth Amendment Fiduciaries, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 
611, 654 (2015) (arguing that entrusting so-called “information fiduciaries” with personal 
information “carries an implicit limitation on use: specifically, an implied covenant to 
avoid using sensitive information in ways that harm the sharing party”). 
66 See Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States: How to Apply the Fourth 
Amendment and its State Analogs to Protect Third Party Information from Unreasonable 
Search, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 373 (2005), quoted in SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 22, at 
296. 
67 New Jersey v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 641 (N.J. 2013). A similar argument has been made 
with regard to telephony and Internet metadata collection: “Even if U.S. citizens wanted to 
opt out of having this information collected, it would be virtually impossible to do so. There 
have, for instance, been advances in encryption. But these technologies all revolve around 
content – not metadata. Although some technologies are focused on metadata, these are 
not sufficiently advanced to allow for real-time communication. The only option is 
therefore not to use a telephone. The cost of doing so, however, would lean towards 
divesting oneself of a role in the modern world – impacting one’s social relationships, 
employment, and ability to conduct financial and personal affairs.” Donohue, supra note 
22, at 874. 
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women to a state hospital for the purpose of obstetric tests. According 
to the majority, the urine tests were “indisputably searches within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment” and that “none of the women 
searched provided either probable cause to believe that they were 
using cocaine, or even the basis for a reasonable suspicion of such 
use.”68 Moreover, under the two-pronged Katz test, the majority ruled 
that “the reasonable expectation of privacy enjoyed by the typical 
patient undergoing diagnostic tests in a hospital is that the results of 
those tests will not be shared with nonmedical personnel without her 
consent.”69 The latter point earned a scathing response from the 
dissent. In reference to the cases involving the use of undercover 
police agents, Justice Scalia acknowledges that “abuse of trust is 
surely a sneaky and ungentlemanly thing, and perhaps there should be 
(as there are) laws against such conduct by the government.”70 At the 
same time, Scalia found that, until Ferguson, the majority has “never 
held – or even suggested – that material which a person voluntarily 
entrusts to someone else cannot be given by that person to the police, 
and used for whatever evidence it may contain. Without so much as 
discussing the point, the Court today opens a hole in our Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, the size and shape of which is entirely 
indeterminate.”71 Justice Scalia is correct in that the decision in 
Ferguson “represents a significant departure from the third-party 
doctrine. Indeed, is urine voluntarily turned over to a hospital really 
any different from tax documents turned over to a bank or metadata 
transmitted to the phone company?”72 Most important, however, is 
that Ferguson further undermines the third-party doctrine’s notion of 
“voluntariness.” If the warrantless search of urine tests provided to a 
hospital for the purpose of obstetric test were constitutional, it could 
only be avoided at the price of not making use of obstetric tests at all. 
 
 
 
 
68 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76 (2001). 
69 Id. at 78 (emphasis added). 
70 Id. at 94 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
71 Id. at 95. 
72 Alexander Galicki, The End of Smith v. Maryland?: The NSA’s Bulk Telephony Metadata 
Program and the Fourth Amendment in the Cyber Age, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 375, 397 
(2015). This interpretation of Ferguson. v. Charleston was recently confirmed by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit: “That the government acquired Appellants’ private 
information through an inspection of third-party records cannot dispose of their Fourth 
Amendment claims.” United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 352 (4th Cir. 2015). 
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A Three-Pronged Test 
In line with these conclusions, we suggest that courts should 
transform their assessment of “voluntariness” into a three-pronged 
test: first, whether a person knowingly shared information with a 
third party; second, whether a person had an alternative not to do so; 
and third, whether that alternative was reasonable. If the answer is 
“yes” to all questions (as is the case with misplaced trust in 
undercover police agents), then a person should not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy for the revealed information. If the answer is 
“no” to all questions (as is the case with CSLI) or “yes” to the first two 
questions but “no” to the third (as is the case in Ferguson v. 
Charleston), then a person should retain a reasonable expectation of 
privacy for the information revealed. 
2. Capabilities 
The more limited collection of pen register data at issue in Smith 
v. Maryland in 1979 is not comparable to the massive aggregation of 
telephony metadata at issue in the NSA’s 2013 bulk telephony 
metadata collection program. In Smith, the police had ordered the 
telephone company to register the numbers dialed from the phone of a 
single person in the context of a specific, temporally limited police 
investigation. By contrast, according to the Snowden documents, the 
NSA collected the telephony metadata of virtually all American 
subscribers in the context of an ongoing national security operation, 
regardless of whether they were suspected of any criminal behavior.73 
Furthermore, as the Klayman court points out, the NSA program 
involved “the creation and maintenance of a historical database 
containing five years’ worth of data”74 and, at the time of the ruling, 
 
 
 
 
73 Subsequent accounts questioned whether the NSA was actually collecting that much 
metadata. See Siobhan Gorman, NSA Collects 20% or Less of U.S. Call Data, WALL ST. J. 
(Feb. 7, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304680904579368831632834004 
[https://perma.cc/8EVH-P2ZA]. However, as several commentators point out in the 
article, this does not make the program any less concerning. First, the NSA still collected 
millions of phone records on a questionable legal basis; second, even if it was not 
successful, it still aspired to collect the vast majority of phone records; and third, the fact 
that the NSA may not actually have collected all the phone records undermines their 
justification for having the program in the first place, namely, to “have the entire haystack” 
for “finding the needle.”  
74 Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 19 (D.D.C. 2013) (emphasis added). 
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there was no planned end of the bulk telephony metadata collection 
program either. According to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit, which reviewed Judge Pauley’s decision in ACLU 
v. Clapper and ultimately overruled it, “[s]uch expansive development 
of government repositories of formerly private records would be an 
unprecedented contraction of the privacy expectations of all 
Americans.”75  
Table 2: A contextual comparison of Smith v. Maryland and the 
NSA’s bulk telephony metadata collection program 
 Smith v. Maryland (1979) 
Bulk Telephony Metadata 
Collection Program (2013) 
Context Single police investigation 
Ongoing national security 
investigation 
Senders 
Single American 
telephone subscriber 
suspected of criminal 
activity 
All American telephone 
subscribers, regardless of whether 
they are suspected of any criminal 
activity 
Subject Various Various 
Attribute Numbers dialed on a phone 
Numbers that placed and received 
the call, the data, time, and 
duration of the call, other session-
identifying information (for 
example, International Mobile 
Subscriber Identity number, 
International Mobile Station 
Equipment Identity number, etc.), 
trunk identifier, and any telephone 
calling card number 
Transmission 
principle 
None; then ECPA 
(1986) 
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT 
Act (2001) 
Furthermore, technological innovations facilitate the storage of a 
much greater amount and variety of data.76 These innovations go both 
ways: not only can the NSA store significantly more data, but 
individuals can also create and maintain much larger databases of 
personal information themselves. For instance, as the Supreme Court 
recognized in Riley v. California (2014), cell phones have effectively 
 
 
 
 
75 ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 818 (2d Cir. 2015). 
76 See Declaration of Professor Edward W. Felten at 23, ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 
724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 13-3994).  
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become “minicomputers.” “The current top-selling smart phone has a 
standard capacity of 16 gigabytes (and is available with up to 64 
gigabytes). Sixteen gigabytes translates to millions of pages of text, 
thousands of pictures, or hundreds of videos.”77 The amount of 
information that can be gleaned from a single device is 
unprecedented. Cell phones contain not only call data, but also 
Internet browsing history and location data, all of which, according to 
precedent, are considered non-content information held by third 
parties and information “in plain view,” respectively, and thus equally 
undeserving of the protection of the Fourth Amendment on a purely 
ontological basis.78  
One could object that the NSA did not actually collect all this 
information in its bulk telephony metadata collection program; 
however, as Judge Leon points out in several footnotes to his ruling, 
the exact scope of the telephony metadata program remains unclear. 
For instance, Judge Leon could not determine “whether ‘telephony 
metadata’ and ‘comprehensive communications routing information’ 
include data relating to text messages. If it does, then in 2012, the 
Government collected an additional six billion communications each 
day (69,635 each second).”79 Furthermore, despite the fact that later 
FISC orders explicitly prohibited the production of CSLI, “not all FISC 
orders have been made public, and I have no idea how location data 
has been handled in the past.”80 But, even if the NSA did not collect 
these kinds of information as part of its bulk telephony metadata 
collection program – and the courts were therefore not in a position to 
define them – it is important to keep in mind that they could plausibly 
be defined as metadata in the future,81 which has serious privacy 
 
 
 
 
77 Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014). 
78 See id. (pointing out that “The sum of an individual’s private life can be reconstructed 
through a thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions; the same 
cannot be said of a photograph or two of loved ones tucked into a wallet”). See also SUSAN 
LANDAU, SURVEILLANCE OR SECURITY?: THE RISKS POSED BY NEW WIRETAPPING 
TECHNOLOGIES 99 (2011) (describing transactional data, i.e., metadata, as the “new gold” of 
wiretapping). 
79 See Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 35 (internal citations omitted). 
80 Id. at 36. 
81 The D.C. Court of Appeals already predicted this in reviewing ACLU v. Clapper: “If the 
government is correct, it could use §215 to collect and store in bulk any other existing 
metadata available anywhere in the private sector, including metadata associated with 
financial records, medical records, and electronic communications (including e-mail and 
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implications if judges continue to rely on an ontological rather than a 
contextual analysis of metadata collection.82  
In the context of Internet communications, that determination has 
already been made: In United States v. Forrester, the court ruled that 
Internet users have no reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail 
headers and IP addresses because they should know that Internet 
service providers (ISPs) necessarily have access to that information in 
order to provide their services.83 (We note that according to our three-
pronged test, however, this reasoning fails the voluntariness 
requirement.) Significantly, the court also found that the type of 
information at hand was indistinguishable from the pen register 
information at issue in Smith: “e-mail to/from addresses and IP 
addresses constitute addressing information and do not necessarily 
reveal any more about the underlying contents of communication than 
do phone numbers.”84 Based on a purely ontological analysis, 
addressing information is metadata and therefore non-sensitive data. 
Finally, as noted earlier, computers can easily analyze metadata 
because it is structured and predictable. This distinguishes it from the 
content of communications which computers still struggle to 
                                                                                                                   
social media information), relating to all Americans.” ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 818 
(2d Cir. 2015). 
82 As a thought experiment, consider recent developments in the field of biometrics: FaceIt, 
a facial recognition software, “can pick someone’s face out of a crowd, extract the face from 
the rest of the scene and compare it to a database of stored images.” See Kevin Bonsor & 
Ryan Johnson, How Facial Recognition Systems Work, HOW STUFF WORKS, 
http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/gadgets/high-tech-gadgets/facial-recognition1.htm 
[https://perma.cc/Y37A-HGJ3]. It can differentiate one face from another based on so-
called nodal points, such as the distance between the eyes, width of the nose, depth of the 
eye sockets, the shape of the cheekbones, the length of the jaw line, etc. One could argue 
that the nodal points constitute the metadata of the face, whereas the identity of the person 
constitutes the content. Emotion sensing machines such as Affdex function in a similar 
manner: “The software scans for a face, if there are multiple faces, it isolates each one. It 
then identifies the face’s main regions – mouth, nose, eyes, eyebrows – and it ascribes 
points to each, rendering the features in simple geometries.” See Raffi Khatchadourian, We 
Know How You Feel, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 1, 2015), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/01/19/know-feel [https://perma.cc/KM84-
HF5Q]. The identifiers, again, could reasonably be described as the metadata of the face, 
whereas the emotions people are experiencing would be considered content. Since the 
latter can automatically be derived from the former, however, we imagine that people 
would demand an equal level of privacy protection for both. 
83 United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2007). 
84 Id. Meanwhile, scholars have demonstrated that email headers do, in fact, contain 
content information and are thus not equivalent to addressing information on physical 
mail. See Bellovin et al., supra note 10. 
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comprehend.85 An analysis of the aggregated metadata then not only 
enables the NSA to infer patterns about social relations and 
associations,86 but also about political and religious beliefs87 and even 
sensitive medical conditions.88 This is one of the big ironies behind 
the idea that metadata can be distinguished from data on the basis 
that it does not reveal anything about the underlying “content” of 
communications. Indeed, as we outlined in Section II.A of our paper, 
the entire purpose of metadata in library and computer sciences is to 
classify and thus reveal essential aspects about the data that it 
describes.89  
What the foregoing analysis attempted to demonstrate is that as 
capabilities in aggregation, storage, combination and analysis of 
metadata increase, so does the amount of information that can be 
gleaned from collecting it. Although we may reasonably expect that a 
cell phone service provider collects the numbers dialed from a phone, 
generally, we do not expect the provider to simultaneously learn about 
our daily whereabouts, our friends and family, our professional 
associations, and our religious denomination. Therefore, as the social 
and technological environment changes, so does the meaning or 
significance of the attributes in an information flow. This is an 
 
 
 
 
85 Especially spoken communication, given different rhythms and intonations of speech, as 
well as accents. See Felten Declaration, supra note 76, ¶ 21. 
86 For a visual representation of what the analysis of aggregated metadata might look like, 
see Immersion Project, MIT MEDIA LAB, https://immersion.media.mit.edu 
[https://perma.cc/2FNJ-Y4ZJ]. 
87 See Felten Declaration, supra note 76, ¶ 46. Since the bulk collection of metadata enables 
law enforcement to identify networks and relationships, it also raises First Amendment, 
and in particular freedom of association, concerns. See Katherine J. Strandburg, 
Membership Lists, Metadata, and Freedom of Association’s Specificity Requirement, 10 
I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 327 (2014).  
88 Jonathan Mayer et al., Evaluating the Privacy Properties of Telephone Metadata, 113 
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5536 (2016), http://www.pnas.org/content/113/20/5536.full.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/644N-EBH]. Interestingly, a number of legal scholars already made this 
argument in the aftermath of Smith v. Maryland. See Applegate & Applegate, supra note 
58, at 766. But of course, the revelatory power of metadata today is even greater. 
89 Sometimes metadata can be even more revealing than the content of communications: 
“Significant social analysis can also be conducted on the data. Sophisticated algorithms, for 
instance, can be applied to pen register information to ascertain where the important 
nodes are in a network. Alliances, friendships, and predilections can be uncovered by 
studying patterns in behavior. And unlike raw content, the type of information that can be 
gleaned is ordered – making it in some ways even more useful than the content itself.” See 
Donohue, supra note 22, at 871. 
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important point because it fundamentally undermines one of the most 
important assumptions underlying the NSA’s justifications for the 
bulk telephony metadata program, namely that metadata is inherently 
non-sensitive data.  From the perspective of the theory of contextual 
integrity, this assumption never made any sense to begin with: no 
information type is inherently sensitive or not. Rather, the privacy 
interest associated with a type of information can only be determined 
in light of an evaluation that takes into consideration all contextual 
parameters, including the senders, subjects and recipients as well as 
transmission principles governing the information flow.  
3. Assumption of risk 
Often, we do not share metadata voluntarily. Furthermore, 
technological innovations in aggregation, storage, combination and 
analysis increase the ability of those with whom we share our data to 
extract useful information from that data. But beyond that, changes in 
the social, technological and legal environment have made previously 
hard to obtain metadata easily accessible so that we effectively assume 
the risk of surveillance whenever we communicate. The extension of 
the doctrine of misplaced trust from people to businesses is a telling 
case. Of course, nobody can protect us against sharing personal 
information with a friend who turns out to be not that great of a friend 
or, in particular instances, an undercover police agent.90 When we 
share intimate information with others we indeed assume the risk that 
those with whom we share our data will be untrustworthy. However, 
the nature of the information sharing changes radically when the 
recipients of an information flow are no longer people but businesses, 
e.g. banks, telephone and web service providers, and hospitals. The 
question here is no longer about the terms of a friendship but the 
terms of a transaction. Of course, the Supreme Court ruled in United 
States v. Miller that  
[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the 
obtaining of information revealed to a third party and 
 
 
 
 
90 In Germany, by contrast, undercover policing “entails a warrant procedure, a showing of 
need, and statutory limits on the crimes that the government may target in this way,” out of 
a historical concern for human dignity. See Jacqueline E. Ross, The Place of Covert 
Surveillance in Democratic Societies: A Comparative Study of the United States and 
Germany, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 493, 562 (2007), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=909010 [https://perma.cc/2BPY-
S9V8]. See also SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 22, at 287. 
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conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the 
information is revealed on the assumption that it will 
be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence 
placed in the third party will not be betrayed.91  
However, in order to support this claim, the Court exclusively 
referenced cases involving undercover police agents, despite the fact 
that a relationship between people is governed by a completely 
different set of transmission principles than a relationship between a 
person and a bank.92 Justice Brennan readily dismissed this argument 
in dissent, quoting representatives from several banks according to 
whom “a bank customer's reasonable expectation is that, absent 
compulsion by legal process, the matters he reveals to the bank will be 
utilized by the bank only for internal banking purposes.”93 The dissent 
in Smith v. Maryland echoed similar concerns: “Those who disclose 
certain facts to a bank or phone company for a limited business 
purpose need not assume that this information will be released to 
other persons for other purposes.”94 Furthermore:  
 
 
 
 
91 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (emphasis added). What makes the 
Miller case particularly contentious is that that “the bank did not just happen to be holding 
the records the government sought. Instead, the Bank Secrecy Act required (and continues 
to require) banks to maintain a copy of every customer check and deposit for six years or 
longer. The government thus compelled the bank to store the information, and then sought 
the information from the bank on the basis that since the bank held the data, there could 
not be any reasonable expectation of privacy and the Fourth Amendment therefore did not 
apply.” Fred H. Cate & Beth E. Cate, The Supreme Court and Information Privacy, 2 INT’L. 
DATA PRIVACY L. 255, 263 (2012), 
https://academic.oup.com/idpl/article/2/4/255/676934/The-Supreme-Court-and-
information-privacy [https://perma.cc/FA7K-BXLA]. 
92 This discrepancy has been pointed out before: “Miller based this ‘assumption of risk’ 
argument on two informer cases, United States v. White and Hoffa v. United States. But to 
name these cases suggests the distinction: one expects a human being to evaluate, digest, 
recall, and perhaps repeat information; a bank merely performs and registers a 
transaction.” Applegate & Applegate, supra note 58, at 756; see also Brennan-Marquez, 
supra note 65. 
93 Miller, 425 U.S. at 449 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
94 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting). The same 
argument was made in the context of mail covers: “[A] reasonable person expects (1) that 
the information contained in the return address will only be used for mail purposes, and 
(2) that it will be utilized in only a mechanical fashion without any records being kept. The 
recording and disclosure to non-postal authorities for non-postal purposes that results 
from a mail cover extends far beyond these narrow bounds.” United States v. Choate, 422 
F. Supp. 261, 270 (C.D. Cal. 1976). 
2017] KIFT & NISSENBAUM 365 
 
At least in the third-party consensual surveillance 
cases, which first incorporated risk analysis into Fourth 
Amendment doctrine, the defendant presumably had 
exercised some discretion in deciding who should enjoy 
his confidential communications. By contrast here, 
unless a person is prepared to forgo use of what for 
many has become a personal or professional necessity, 
he cannot help but accept the risk of surveillance.95 
At present, of course, sharing personal information and the 
associated metadata with third parties has become an even greater 
personal and professional necessity. A 2013 longitudinal study of 
American youth revealed that young adults communicate about as 
much via digital media such as email and social networks as they 
communicate face-to-face.96 Cell phones, as Judge Leon points out in 
Klayman v. Obama, have become ubiquitous:  
Count the phones at the bus stop, in a restaurant, or 
around the table at a work meeting or any given 
occasion. Thirty-four years ago, none of these phones 
would have been there. Thirty-four years ago, city 
streets were lined with pay phones. Thirty-four years 
ago, when people wanted to send ‘text messages,’ they 
wrote letters and attached postage stamps.97 
The pervasive use of electronic devices, often connected to the 
Internet, generates an overwhelming quantity of metadata, which 
would all remain unprotected were we to assume that any disclosure 
to a third party exposes us to further risks of surveillance. Most 
importantly, as Judge Leon points out in direct reference to U.S. Dep’t 
 
 
 
 
95 Smith, 442 U.S. at 749-50 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting). A similar argument was 
made in the case preceding Smith v. Maryland: “Even if the majority’s analogy to Miller is 
valid, (and I do not agree) and Smith should have expected that the telephone company 
could itself monitor his phone for billing purposes, to improve service to its customers, or 
to verify complaints, Smith nevertheless had a reasonable expectation that the telephone 
company would not, without the safeguards of appropriate legal process, act for the 
government in collecting information relevant to a criminal prosecution.” Smith v. 
Maryland, 389 A.2d 858, 872-73 (C.A. Md. 1978) (Cole, J., dissenting). 
96 Jon D. Miller, Social Capital: Networking in Generation X, 2 Generation X Rep. 2, 6 
(2013), http://lsay.org/GenX_Vol2Iss2.pdf [https://perma.cc/KYF3-WU5T].  
97 Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 35 (D.D.C. 2013).  
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of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, “[i]t’s one thing 
to say that people expect phone companies to occasionally provide 
information to law enforcement; it is quite another to suggest that our 
citizens expect all phone companies to operate what is effectively a 
joint intelligence operation with the Government.”98 Thus, the NSA 
program essentially introduced a completely different set of recipients 
into the original information flow between telephone users and service 
providers, thereby violating contextual integrity and hence also the 
privacy expectations of the customers so affected.  
Apart from U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom 
of Press and Jones, cases emerging in the context of finance have also 
supported the proposition that individuals should not be forced to 
assume the risk of surveillance whenever they disclose information, 
particularly if the information in question was previously hard to 
obtain. A case in point is the dispute between the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) and the credit bureaus when Congress passed the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), which: 
[R]equired financial institutions to provide notice to 
consumers prior to transmitting covered information to 
others, and to permit them to opt out (subject to 
certain exceptions). This meant that credit header 
information, which previously had been freely sold (for 
such purposes as target marketing), was now subject to 
GLBA requirements.99  
While TransUnion and the Individual Reference Services Group 
(IRSG) had assumed a narrow definition of financial information, 
which would be regulated by the GLBA, it turned out that the 
definition of non-public personal information (NPI) Congress 
assumed was wider-ranging, including “any list, description, or other 
grouping of consumers (and publicly available information pertaining 
to them) that is derived using any nonpublic personal information 
other than publicly available information.”100 According to the court 
this meant that Congress had “provided for especially broad privacy 
protections for all information contained in these lists of consumers 
 
 
 
 
98 Id. at 33. 
99 NISSENBAUM, supra note 52, at 154. 
100 15 U.S.C. § 6809 (1999). 
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that is derived using nonpublic personal information. This is so even 
where the information is otherwise publicly available: the 
information is still protected, as long as it was derived using nonpublic 
personal information.”101 The court thus recognized a right to privacy 
in the information, despite the fact that it was available in public. In 
our view this can be attributed both to an unacknowledged shift in 
transmission principle – when information is provided by commercial 
credit bureaus instead of public channels – and to the violation of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in public information – when it is 
compiled and used out of context.  
B. Evaluation 
The NSA’s bulk telephony metadata collection program has 
introduced changes in the actors, attributes and transmission 
principles of the information flows in a national security context and 
therefore constitutes a prima facie violation of the principle of 
contextual integrity. But the analysis does not end here. While the 
theory presumptively favors protecting the integrity of entrenched 
informational norms – more simply, the status quo – it also allows for 
information environments to evolve “if new practices are 
demonstrably more effective at achieving contextual values, ends, and 
purposes or the equivalent.”102 A contextual analysis of the NSA’s bulk 
telephony metadata program therefore requires an evaluation of the 
moral and political factors affected by the program and whether the 
benefits of its disruptive information flows outweigh potential costs as 
a function of its impact on contextually specific goals and ends.103 
The context in question is that of national security. Following the 
traumatic events of September 11, 2001, the prevention of any further 
terrorist attacks and the concomitant loss of American lives on 
American soil became a paramount goal of U.S. homeland security. 
Critics have pointed out, however, that the intelligence community 
was hampered not predominantly because of insufficient information 
collection but because of failures in information sharing practices 
between intelligence and law enforcement agencies, such as the NSA 
 
 
 
 
101 Individual Reference Services Group, Inc. v. FTC, 145 F. Supp. 2d 6, 27 (D.D.C. 2001) 
(emphasis added). 
102 NISSENBAUM, supra note 52, at 180. 
103 Id. at 182. 
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and FBI – information they already had thanks to conventional law 
enforcement techniques.104 Nevertheless, pressed to answer for the 
terrible events of 9/11, the intelligence community radically expanded 
the scope of its information collection efforts.105 
Even the remote possibility that the collect-it-all approach might 
forestall terrorism may explain why the intelligence community 
interpreted the FISA business records provision as it did – that is, to 
justify the bulk telephony metadata collection program. The business 
records provision states that “the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation or a designee of the Director (whose rank shall be no 
lower than Assistant Special Agent in Charge) may make an 
application for an order requiring the production of any tangible 
things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other 
items)” provided that “the tangible things sought are relevant to an 
authorized investigation.”106 Given that terrorists could be hiding 
behind any number of telecommunications devices in the United 
States, the government relied on this language to argue “that all 
telephone calls in the United States, including those of a wholly local 
nature, are ‘relevant’ to foreign intelligence investigations.”107 As 
several commentators have since pointed out, this stretches the 
relevance standard beyond recognition as “any data might be 
‘relevant’ to an investigation eventually, if by ‘eventually’ you mean 
‘sometime before the end of time.’”108 
Theoretically these measures could, however, be justified in light 
of contextual integrity if they ultimately achieve the goal of national 
security more effectively than past measures, namely in preventing 
 
 
 
 
104 See PETER BERGEN ET AL., NEW AM. FOUND., DO NSA’S BULK SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS 
STOP TERRORISTS? (2014), 
https://www.newamerica.org/downloads/IS_NSA_surveillance.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9J7L-VWRK]; see generally Mattathias Schwartz, The Whole Haystack, 
THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 26, 2015), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/01/26/whole-haystack 
[https://perma.cc/Q543-ZSAH]. 
105 See GARRETT M. GRAFF, THE THREAT MATRIX: THE FBI AT WAR 391-430 (2011). 
106 See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, § 501, 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2016) 
(emphasis added). 
107 See Donohue, supra note 22, at 836-37 (2014). 
108 Jennifer Stisa Granick & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Criminal N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES 
(June 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/28/opinion/the-criminal-
nsa.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/ZR99-PGCJ].  
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future terrorist attacks. As if responding to this requirement, U.S. 
government and intelligence representatives repeatedly claimed that 
the bulk telephony metadata collection program contributed to 
thwarting over 50 different terrorist attacks.109 These claims, however, 
were challenged in a report of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
Board (PCLOB), which was tasked with evaluating the surveillance 
programs made public through the Snowden revelations. The Board 
was unable to identify “a single instance involving a threat to the 
United States in which the program made a concrete difference in the 
outcome of a counterterrorism investigation.”110 The only case in 
which the bulk collection of telephony metadata played a significant 
role in the containment of terrorist activity was in the arrest of Basaaly 
Moalin, a Somali-born citizen, who was convicted of sending $8,500 
to the Shabaab.111 Even in this case, the PCLOB cautioned that “the 
suspect was not involved in planning a terrorist attack and there is 
reason to believe that the FBI may have discovered him without the 
contribution of the NSA’s program.”112 
Costs associated with the bulk collection of telephony metadata 
have been significant. It is difficult for civilians to assess financial 
costs precisely because much of the relevant information remains 
classified and we can only assume that the program forms part of the 
“massive increases in homeland security expenditures that have taken 
place since 9/11 – increases that total well over $1 trillion.”113 Even if 
total costs have not increased, however, allocating resources to 
 
 
 
 
109 See BERGEN ET AL., supra note 104; Justin Elliott & Theodoric Meyer, Claim on ‘Attacks 
Thwarted’ by NSA Spreads Despite Lack of Evidence, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 23, 2013), 
http://www.propublica.org/article/claim-on-attacks-thwarted-by-nsa-spreads-despite-
lack-of-evidence [https://perma.cc/T5VD-3J6E]; Cindy Cohn & Dia Kayyali, The Top 5 
Claims that Defenders of the NSA have to Stop Making to Remain Credible, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUND. (June 2, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/06/top-5-claims-
defenders-nsa-have-stop-making-remain-credible [https://perma.cc/37TB-WMYR].  
110 PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS 
PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE 
OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 11 (2014) 
https://www.pclob.gov/library/215-Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8W4L-7EDF].  
111 Schwartz, supra note 104. 
112 PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 110, at 11. 
113 John Mueller & Mark G. Stewart, Secret without Reason and Costly without 
Accomplishment: Questioning the National Security Agency’s Metadata Program, 10 I/S: 
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expanding the surveillance apparatus necessarily requires a 
diminishment of resources for traditional and targeted surveillance 
that, in the past, has proven effective in preventing terrorist attacks.114  
Beyond material costs, the NSA’s bulk telephony metadata 
program threatens a deep compromise of fundamental civil liberties 
such as privacy, freedom of speech and association, transparency, due 
process and the balance of power between the government and its 
citizens. As a government program, bulk telephony metadata 
collection must be evaluated not only in light of the ends and values of 
national security, but also the ends and values of the larger context in 
which national security is embedded, namely, that of a free, open and 
above all democratic society. The evidence at hand – costs, benefits, 
and threats to liberal democratic values – challenges the legitimacy of 
the bulk telephony metadata collection program.115 
C. Outlook 
The decisions in ACLU v. Clapper and Klayman v. Obama have 
both been reviewed by appeals courts. In ACLU v. Clapper, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated Judge Pauley’s 
decision, arguing that the bulk telephony metadata program went 
beyond the statutory authorization of Section 215.116 In Klayman v. 
Obama, on the other hand, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit overruled Judge Leon’s injunction on the basis that “the 
plaintiffs had not met the ‘higher burden of proof required for a 
preliminary injunction’ with regard to their standing.”117 Both cases 
have been remanded to the respective district courts. Meanwhile 
Congress passed the USA Freedom Act, which, among other things, 
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prohibits the bulk collection of telephony metadata by the NSA.118 In 
future, phone companies rather than the NSA will retain the metadata 
of their customers.119 The NSA can access it with court approval. 
However, neither the passage of the USA Freedom Act, nor the 
appeals decisions in ACLU v. Clapper and Klayman v. Obama 
systematically address the question of how Fourth Amendment 
challenges to bulk metadata collection programs will be handled in the 
future – an increasingly important question as the amount and 
diversity of metadata increases. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This paper has demonstrated that a reasonable expectation of 
privacy depends not only on what metadata is – an ontological 
assessment – but also on the context in which it is created and 
collected – a normative assessment. The paper has shown that the 
social and technological environment of the NSA's bulk telephony 
metadata collection program is radically different from that of the pen 
register collection at issue in Smith. These differences primarily 
manifest themselves in the ability of information subjects to share 
information voluntarily; the ability of the recipients of our metadata 
to aggregate, store, combine and analyze that data; and the extent to 
which we assume the risk of metadata being shared beyond the 
purpose for which it was originally provided. Significantly, this paper 
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proposes a three-pronged test for evaluating if third-party information 
sharing is voluntary, namely: First, whether a person knowingly 
shares information with a third party; second, whether a person has 
an alternative not to do so; and third, whether that alternative is 
reasonable. The paper draws on the theory of contextual integrity to 
analyze how fundamental changes in the social and technological 
environment have affected the actors, attributes and transmission 
principles of relevant information flows, and concludes that the NSA’s 
bulk telephony metadata collection program violates the principle of 
contextual integrity. An evaluation of the program in light of 
contextually specific values and ends demonstrates that the costs 
incurred by the collection of telephony metadata in bulk – both in 
material terms in the context of national security and in terms of the 
fundamental civil liberties affected by the program, such as privacy, 
freedom of speech and association, transparency, due process and the 
balance of power between a government and its citizens – call into 
question the program’s moral legitimacy. Most importantly, the paper 
demonstrates that the main assumption underlying the NSA’s 
program – namely, that metadata, by definition, is non-sensitive data 
– no longer makes sense. Indeed, according to the theory of 
contextual integrity, it never made any sense to begin with. 
 
 
